We employ several different approaches to estimate the political position of Australian media outlets, relative to federal parliamentarians. First, we use parliamentary mentions to code over 100 public intellectuals on a left-right scale. We then estimate slant by using the number of mentions that each public intellectual receives in each media outlet. Second, we have independent raters separately code front-page election stories and headlines. Third, we tabulate the number of electoral endorsements that newspapers give to each side of politics in federal elections. Overall, we find that the Australian media are quite centrist, with very few outlets being statistically distinguishable from the middle of Australian politics. It is possible that this is due to the lack of competition in the Australian media market. To the extent that we can separate content slant from editorial slant, we find some evidence that editors are more partisan than journalists.
Introduction
As the primary means through which politicians communicate with the electorate, a free and fair media is integral to a healthy democratic system. 1 It is, therefore, hardly surprising that journalists and politicians are acutely concerned about the political leanings of media outlets. Occasionally, media outlets boast of their influence, as with The Sun newspaper claiming the day after the Conservative victory in the 1992 UK election "It"s The Sun Wot Won It". More frequently, politicians object to perceptions of favoritism, as when Barack Obama described Fox News in 2009 as "one television station that is entirely devoted to attacking my administration."
In this paper, we focus on measuring media slant. We define a news outlet as being slanted if it gives more favorable coverage to one side of politics than the other. While measuring media slant is both important and policy-relevant, it is also empirically difficult.
For example, most media outlets tend to provide a greater volume of coverage to the incumbent political party than to opposition political parties. We do not regard differences in the volume of coverage in itself as being a form of media slant. However, a media outlet that criticized all opposition proposals and praised all government announcements would be regarded as slanted.
A good measure of media slant ought to reflect the ideological affinity between a particular media outlet and one side of politics. In effect, such a measure plots media outlets onto the political spectrum, allowing us to answer questions like: "If this newspaper were a politician, how would it vote?" Note that we deliberately use the term "media slant" instead of "media bias", for the reason that our measures are relative rather than absolute. To see this, suppose that a political party were to publicly pronounce that the earth is flat. In this instance, one might expect that most -if not all -media outlets would denounce that political party, perhaps making unkind comments about the intellect and judgment of the party"s leaders as they did so. If an election were in the offing, editorials in some newspapers might even opine that these pronouncements made the party unfit to govern. Such an event would not reflect media bias, 1 Press freedom is enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." An annual "Freedom of the Press Index" compiled by Freedom House tracks the extent to which media outlets are subject to overt political control, as well as the potential for ownership concentration to lead to bias. In the 2008 report, Freedom House rates the freedom of the press in Australia as 35 th out of 195 nations.
since journalists are judging politicians statements against an absolute standard (scientific truth). However, it would be captured as a form of "media slant".
Relative to the previous literature, our paper makes two main advances. The first relates to the methodology for estimating media slant. We introduce a new measure of media slant, based on the political positions of public intellectuals, which is different from those that have previously been used in the literature. We then compare this measure with the results from other approaches, such as the political positions of think tanks (as used in Groseclose and Milyo 2003) , or the coding of articles. Another methodological contribution of our work is to separate the journalistic stance of a media outlet from its editorial stance; a distinction that has not previously been made in the economics literature.
Our second main contribution has to do with the structure of the media market. In our empirical analysis, we focus on Australia, in contrast with a literature that has previously been heavily focused on the United States. This has the advantage that it allows us to see the extent to which US findings can be generalized into other contexts, and study a media market that is more heavily concentrated.
Politically, Australia is a bicameral parliamentary democracy with single-member electorates in House of Representatives and multi-member electorates (with state/territory boundaries) in the Senate. Voting is compulsory (with a fine of A$20, a little less than the median hourly wage), and ballots are counted using preferential voting (also known as instant runoff voting in the House of Representative and Single Transferrable Vote in the Senate). At the national level, there are effectively two political parties: the left-leaning Australian Labor Party, and a right-wing Coalition of the predominantly urban Liberal Party of Australia and the rural National Party of Australia. Party discipline is strong, and it is extremely rare for members to "cross the floor" and vote with the opposing party. 2 Our analysis focuses on the period 1996-2007, when the Coalition held office at the federal level.
Although two-party politics considerably simplifies our analysis, it is worth noting that it may have the effect of collapsing multi-dimensional differences into a single continuum. Although most of the differences in Australian politics can be mapped onto a standard left-right spectrum (eg., size of government, level of labor market regulation), our approach does not allow for the possibility of a second axis (eg., authoritarian versus libertarian). 3 In practice, we believe that this is unlikely to be a problem, given that Australia has strong party discipline, and a much lower emphasis than in US politics on issues of personal liberty such as abortion, gun control, or religious education.
To measure media slant, we use three approaches. Our main approach is to use the political positions of "public intellectuals" (ie., commentators and academics who are regularly quoted in both parliament and the press). Based upon positive mentions on the floor of parliament, we place each of the public intellectuals on the political spectrum. Based on mentions in the media, we then develop an aggregated index of the political position of each media outlet.
Our second measure of media slant relies on content analysis. After removing all identifying information (eg., headline, newspaper name), we asked a team of people, which we refer to as "coders," to rate -on a left/right scale -all front-page newspaper articles on political topics that appeared during the month before the 2004 Australian election.
Combining these ratings provided us with a proxy for the media slant of major journalists at these newspapers.
Third, we estimate a measure of the media slant of editors. For this purpose, we asked the same team of coders to give a left/right rating to all front page political stories in the 2004 election campaign. We also coded all newspaper editorials over this period, and counted the number of endorsements that each newspaper gave to each political party.
To summarize our results, we find that there is some dispersion of media slant in Australia when we use media mentions of public intellectuals. Interestingly, newspapers tend to be located to the left of that range while talk-back radio and television are located to the right. Only one of the 27 outlets we study (the ABC Channel 2 television station) is significantly distinguishable from the center position. These results are robust to various specifications. We also find that there has been no systematic evolution in slant over time. To the extent that cross-country comparisons are possible, our results suggest that the overall range of media slant is more concentrated than has been observed for the US.
We also examine newspaper article content and find that in reporting the 2004 election, there is relatively little bias in that content. Similarly, in absolute terms the same can be said for article headlines (which are determined at an editorial level). On both contentcoding metrics, only one outlet (The Age newspaper) is distinguishable from the center position. The same, however, cannot be said for editorial endorsements that, interestingly, are highly correlated with observed bias in article headlines. This suggests that slant is determined at an editorial level rather than through pressure or article selection by journalists.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we examine the literature relating media slant as a function of the degree of competition between media outlets in a market. In section 3, we present results using public intellectuals as a crosswalk from parliament to the press. In section 4, we present results from content coding, and in section 5, we present results from coding headlines and editorials. The final section concludes.
Media Slant and Competition
Perhaps the most obvious difference between Australia and the US where previous studies of media slant have been undertaken is the degree of media consolidation. In Australia, in major capital cities, there are two or three major newspapers and a limited variety of non-music radio outlets. 4 This is in contrast the US that may have additional local and certainly nation-wide newspapers and a host of both AM and FM radio outlets.
The key question is whether we expect competition between media outlets to impact on the degree of media slant. Basic industrial economics is divided on this issue. On the one hand, competition can generate increased variety. On the other, as exemplified by Hotelling"s famous example, competition can lead to mimicry on the part of firms in the product positioning. Either way, media markets are a complex interaction between the outlets themselves, readers and advertisers that make the analysis of competition more challenging. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) consider a situation where news outlets are tempted to bias reporting towards the existing biases of their readers in order to be seen as a more credible information source in their eyes. Not surprising, that interaction leads to an opposite outcome in terms of accurate information flows. They demonstrate that competition between independent news outlets does reduce such bias. But simply, competition is a check on inaccurate reporting and the risk of being caught out and losing their reputation keeps news outlets more honest in their information provision.
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That said, it is also possible that readers, reports or governments might actually prefer biased reporting. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) show that when readers prefer their news biased, increased competition works to satisfy that demand; perhaps too much so leading to more polarization than is actually the case amongst the citizenry.
Thus, competition works to satisfy the preferences of readers. If readers demand truthful reporting, competition will assist in supplying that and media will be less biased. If readers do not demand truthful reporting but prefer bias, competition will supply a biased media. What is true for either model is where the media is not profit-driven (e.g., is publicly owned), there should be no distortion. 
Using Public Intellectuals to Estimate Media Slant
In the US literature on media slant, two approaches that have been employed are to use think tanks as a crosswalk (Groseclose and Milyo 2005) , and to use common phrases (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2009) . For a relatively small country like Australia (with a population of 21 million), neither of these approaches are ideal. Since Australia has relatively few think tanks, using them as a crosswalk would potentially make our results vulnerable to mis-coding one or two think tanks (though we, nonetheless, present these results for the purpose of comparison). In the case of common phrases, there is considerably less "message discipline" in Australia than in the United States. For example, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2009) discuss the way in which political strategists deliberately encouraged Republican representatives to use the phrases "death tax", "war on terror", and "personal accounts" (by contrast, Democratic representatives were more likely to say "estate tax", "war in Iraq" and "private accounts"). It is rare for Australian political parties to manage the language choice of their representatives to the same extent.
Our approach is to use Australian public intellectuals as a crosswalk from parliament to the press. "Public intellectual" is a somewhat loosely defined term, which we understand to mean individuals who are regarded as authorities on particular policy issues. This might include academics, think tank researchers, authors, and former political advisers. Since we did not wish to create our own ad-hoc list of public intellectuals, we used a list compiled by the Sydney Morning Herald (Visontay 2005a This involved a research assistant reading each of the Hansard references, and coding only those mentions that cast the public intellectual in a neutral or positive light. 12 We did not include mentions in which parliamentarians referred to public intellectuals in negative terms.
An example of a quote that was not included in our study is the following, from Senator John government and attacking the record of these fine and distinguished Australians.
Of the 147 public intellectuals, 40 were never mentioned in parliament. The remaining 107 public intellectuals garnered a total of 1517 parliamentary mentions. However, the distribution of media mentions is quite skewed. Among public intellectuals who were mentioned once or more, the mean number of mentions is 14 and the median number of mentions is 6.
14 Labor members of parliament were slightly more likely to mention public intellectuals on this list than were Coalition members of parliament. Across the public intellectuals, 47 percent of the mentions were from Coalition politicians, while the remaining 53 percent were from Labor MPs or Senators. (The weighted mean is also 47 percent.)
Naturally, with a small number of mentions, it is possible that a particular public intellectual might be mentioned more often by one side of politics merely by chance. For each public intellectual, we therefore estimate the two-sided p-value from a binomial probability test on the hypothesis that the public intellectual received 47 percent of mentions from the Coalition (being the mean in the sample).
For 21 of the public intellectuals, the p-value on this test is less than 0.05, suggesting that they are mentioned significantly more by one side of politics than the other. Among A full list of the public intellectuals may be found in Appendix Table 1 .
Beginning with the 107 public intellectuals who received at least one mention in parliament, we then carried out a search of the Australian media for all instances in which each individual was mentioned in a particular media outlet. We chose to search across ten media mentions of the public intellectuals in our sample.
Our newspapers are chosen because they are the largest in Australia; covering a mix of broadsheet and tabloids. In the case of radio, we chose the main public broadcaster (the ABC) and included ABC Radio National, plus the ABC stations in Australia"s five largest cities. We then chose the major talk radio stations in those cities. For television, we chose the largest television stations, which include two public broadcasters: a mainstream station (ABC), and a public broadcaster with a mandate to focus on broadcasts that "reflect Australia's multicultural society" (SBS).
Because we are using a Media Monitors database (necessary if we are to include radio and television), the media records include total mentions, which may be positive and negative. Although this could, in principle, cause us to erroneously include negative mentions, newspaper searches suggested to us that it was extremely rare for a media outlet to mention a public intellectual in a negative manner. Although politicians sometimes attack public intellectuals, virtually all mentions of public intellectuals in media outlets are neutral or positive.
To estimate the political position of each media outlet, we simply estimate a weighted OLS regression, in which the dependent variable P is the share of Coalition mentions by a given public intellectual i in media outlet j in time period t, and the independent variable is a vector of indicator variables for each media outlet:
We are now left with the question of how to choose an optimal weighting scheme for aggregating parliamentary mentions and media mentions. Clearly, these weights should be an increasing function of the number of parliamentary mentions (since frequent mentions in parliament increase the precision with which we can estimate a public intellectual"s ideological position), and an increasing function of the number of media mentions (since 15 Due to data limitations, we are not able to search further back than this for most publications; however our results are robust to dropping Hansard searches for 1996-98. media outlets who mention a given public intellectual more frequently are demonstrating their preference for that individuals.
We opt to use a weighting scheme that is the product of the square root of the number of parliamentary mentions and the number of media mentions. Where p is the number of parliamentary mentions received by public intellectual i in period t and m is the number of media mentions given to public intellectual i in media outlet j in period t, the weight w given to a particular observation is:
Using square root weights has the advantage that (unlike log weights), the weights are still defined for observations with zeros. It also captures the intuition that the standard error of the mean of a binomial variable is equal to the square root of the sample size, multiplied by the mean, multiplied by one minus the mean, ie., SE=[np(1-p)] 0.5 .
Aggregating media mentions in this manner allows us to give each media outlet a simple scale. Recall that the average public intellectual received 47 percent of mentions from Coalition members of parliament. Thus, an outlet with a score of 0.47 evenly allocates its time across Coalition-favored and Labor-favored public intellectuals. An outlet with a score above 0.47 is more inclined to give time to Coalition-favored intellectuals, while an outlet with a score below 0.47 is inclined to give more time to Labor-favored intellectuals.
We begin by estimating aggregated rankings for the entire time period. Table 1 presents our estimates of the political position of each of the media outlets in our sample, along with the standard error of that estimate and the number of public intellectuals mentioned by that outlet (naturally, outlets with more mentions have smaller standard errors).
The main estimate uses all public intellectuals. All but one media outlet is within two standard errors of the center position, 0.47. On this metric, the only media outlet that is significantly slanted is the ABC Channel 2 television station, which is significantly proCoalition during the period in question. However, even here the difference is relatively small, with ABC television"s estimate being 0.51.
Several other interesting patterns can be seen in the data. As a group, newspapers tend to be more pro-Labor than radio and television stations. Of the 27 outlets listed in Table   1 , the seven most pro-Labor outlets are newspapers. At the other end of the spectrum, television and talk radio tend to dominate, with the seven most pro-Coalition outlets being of these two types. One possible interpretation of this is that it reflects an underlying ideological slant across these different media. However, it is also conceivable that this is partly due to our approach for measuring slant (e.g. perhaps right-wing intellectuals are more telegenic than left-wing intellectuals).
Another pattern is a slight tendency for ideological clustering by radio stations in the same local market. While the overall standard deviation of the media slant estimate is 0.016 across all radio stations, the within-city standard deviation is somewhat smaller, at 0.014.
However, it is not clear from this result whether the local ABC radio stations are shifting toward their commercial counterparts, whether the commercial stations are shifting towards the ABC stations, or whether both are tailoring themselves to local attitudes. 17 However, it is also conceivable that our results reflect the lack of competition in the Australian media market.
In Table 2 , we show a number of alternative specifications, which we compare against the main estimate (shown in Table 1 ). The first check omits public intellectuals who write regular op-ed columns from the estimate of that outlet"s slant. This makes little difference to any outlet except The Australian newspaper, which appears considerably more pro-Labor if its columnists are omitted. 18 Naturally, omitting newspaper columnists makes no difference to the rankings of radio and television (though it occasionally has a trivial impact on the standard error of those estimates).
The second check drops the public intellectuals from two right-wing think tanks (the Centre for Independent Studies and the Institute of Public Affairs) that we added to the Sydney Morning Herald list of public intellectuals. The third specification check uses only the 21 public intellectuals (listed above) who are mentioned significantly more often by one side of politics than the other. Again, these different approaches make little difference to the main results. for the changes are small, and in all cases the standard error is larger than the magnitude of the change. To what extent are media outlets" political positions a function of the ideology of their audience? To test this, we re-estimated the results in Table 1 separately for each medium (newspapers, radio and television). Aggregating at this level allows us to get a more precise estimate of ideology. The results from this exercise are presented in Table 4 . Across media types, only newspapers are centrist. Radio and television (taking all stations together in each case) seem to be pro-Coalition, as we can reject at the 1 percent significance level the hypothesis that the slant equals 0.47.
Using the 2004
Australian Election Study, we analyze the political preferences of voters who followed the election by newspapers, radio or television. On average, 54.9 percent of respondents in the Australian Election Study said that they voted for the Coalition (slightly above the true national figure of 52.7 percent). However, the share of Coalition voters among newspaper readers is just 49.8 percent, and the share among radio listeners was 44.2 percent.
Controlling for factors such as age, gender and income makes no qualitative difference to this result. Thus when measured by content, the ordering of the three media (from most left-wing to most right-wing) is newspapers, radio and television. When measured by consumer preferences, the ordering of the three media is radio, newspapers, and television. 
Coding Article Content
Another way that one can determine media slant is to directly analyze the content of articles. To assess this, we compiled a large file containing all of the front-page political stories published in nine newspapers during the 2004 election campaign. 20 In Australia, election campaigns last from the date on which the election is called until polling day, which in this case was August 29 to October 9, 2004. 20 This part of our analysis did not include the Australian Financial Review.
Our sample consisted of 284 articles, which were rated by five independent coders.
We asked each coder to rate the article on a five-point scale:
1. Very pro-Labor 2. Somewhat pro-Labor
3.
Middle of the road 4. Somewhat pro-Coalition
Very pro-Coalition
Our full instructions to coders are set out in Appendix 1.
To check whether coders agreed with one another, we calculated the pairwise correlation between all possible pairs of coders (with 5 coders, there are 10 possible pairs).
The correlations ranged from 0.32 to 0.60, with a mean of 0.48. This suggests that there was a reasonably high degree of consensus between the coders.
As in the previous section, we simply calculate the political position of each media outlet by estimating an OLS regression, in which the dependent variable is the rating of a given article by a particular coder. Because all coders looked at all articles, the regression is unweighted.
The results are shown in Table 5 . Across the nine newspapers, the mean article rating is close to three (being middle-of-the-road). The only newspaper whose mean score is significantly different from three is The Age, which is rated by our coders as tending slightly pro-Labor. However, even in this case, the differences are quite slight. Pooling the five raters, 12 percent of articles in The Age were regarded as very pro-Labor, 28 percent as somewhat pro-Labor, 37 percent as middle of the road, 18 percent as somewhat pro-Coalition, and 5 percent as very pro-Coalition. A full breakdown of the coding is presented in Appendix Table   2 . Sources: Article coding, authors" calculations, journalist survey from Henningham (1995) ; Crikey bias-o-meter from Simons (2007) . Note: In the article coding, *** denotes that the newspaper"s mean score is significantly different from 3, at the 1 percent significance level. Journalist survey ranges from 1 (very Labor) to 5 (very Liberal). Bias-o-meter estimate ranges from -10 (far left) to 10 (far right).
We are aware of two other measures of journalistic slant, which are also presented in Table 5 . The first is a survey conducted by John Henningham in 1992, published as Henningham (1995) . That survey asked 1068 journalists the question: "Thinking only of news and feature content, how would you rate the party political bias, if any, of the following". Respondents were given five options: Very Labor, Slightly Labor, Middle of Road, Slightly Liberal, Very Liberal. These were coded from 1 to 5, and thus correspond with our article coding.
The other measure is a "bias-o-meter" compiled by media commentator Margaret Simons (2007) , and published in the online newsletter Crikey.com.au. Newspapers were rated on a scale that ostensibly ran from -10 to +10, though in fact the spread was only from -3 to +8. As with the other metrics used in this paper, higher numbers denote newspapers that
Simons regards as more favorable to the Coalition.
These three measures correlate quite well with one another. The correlation between the article coding and journalist survey is 0.50; the correlation between the article coding and the bias-o-meter is 0.41, and the correlation between the journalist survey and the bias-ometer is 0.72.
Coding Editorial Slant
Although many studies make no distinction between journalistic slant and editorial slant, there is some reason to imagine that the two might diverge. Journalists are more likely to be in contact with one another, which may lead to a similar way of thinking. Conversely, editors are more likely to be in contact with proprietors, which may engender biases of its own. However, since editors hire and manage journalists, there is a limit to the extent to which the two groups can diverge from one another within a single publication.
To code editorial slant, we use two approaches. First, we use the same methodology as in coding articles to estimate the slant of front-page headlines. These headlines are chosen by editors rather than journalists. Perhaps because headlines are shorter than articles, our coders were more likely to agree with one another when coding headlines than when coding articles. While the mean inter-rater correlation for articles is 0.48, it is 0.61 for headlines (ranging from 0.51 to 0.74 across the ten combinations of coder-pairs). Notably, the interrater correlation for a given article or headline is higher than the correlation for the article and headline combined, on a given story. For each rater, we estimated the correlation between how s/he coded the article and how s/he coded the headline of that same story. These correlations ranged from 0.30 to 0.59 with a mean of 0.44. In other words, a rater"s coding of a given article tends to be closer to another rater"s coding of the same article than to that rater"s coding of the corresponding headline. This supports the notion that article slant and editorial slant may not always coincide precisely. Table 6 presents the results from our headline coding exercise. For most newspapers, the mean is statistically indistinguishable from 3 (suggesting that the average headline during the 2004 election campaign is classified as ideologically middle of the road). The only exception is The Age, whose headlines are classified as significantly pro-Labor (at the 5 percent significance level).
Our second measure of editorial slant is editorial endorsements in the five federal elections from 1996 to 2007. Since newspapers do not always editorialize in favor of one side or the other, we separately show Coalition and Labor endorsements (a full breakdown for each election is provided in Appendix Table 3 ). The final column of Table 6 Table 4 .
We find that all outlets which donated money to political parties gave more to the Coalition, which received a total of $158,145 more than Labor. Put differently, the Coalition received $1.39 for each dollar given by media proprietors to the Labor Party. Strikingly, no media outlet"s proprietors gave more money to Labor than to the Coalition, and for newspapers, the ratio averaged around 3 to 1.
However, we again find no significant relationship between media slant (as measured in Table 1 ), and the difference -or ratio -of Coalition funding to Labor funding. This remains true if we use headline coding or editorial endorsements (though this may reflect the small sample of newspapers for which we have donations data).
The right half of Table 7 Table 5 .) In total, the two parties spent around $6 million on reported advertising in these outlets during that election. On average, the Coalition outspent Labor on advertising in newspapers, but this is driven by large disparities in the two newspapers where the Coalition spent more: the Advertiser and the Courier Mail. On radio, the Coalition spent more, with at least 3:1 differences in Brisbane 4BC and Sydney 2UE. Labor spent more on television advertising. We find a significant positive relationship between the advertising spending difference (Coalition minus Labor) and the media slant of a given outlet.
As this is a correlation, interpreting this result is difficult. It is consistent with the simple notion that advertising dollars may be an explicit or implicit payment to proprietors for favorable coverage. However, it is also possible that it would be driven by political parties observations of media slant. For example, parties might want to avoid placing ads where coverage alongside them is unfavorable. That said, it is also possible that advertising in outlets slanted away from their interests might enable them to target potential swing voters in their direction. Consequently, we state the positive correlation as a result of interest but with specific interpretation requiring more information and study than we are able to provide here. Source: Authors" calculations, based on data from the Australian Electoral Commission. "N/A" denotes that data were not available. Blank cells denote zero donations/ advertising expenditure, and are not used in estimating the correlations in the final row.
Discussion and Conclusion
Media slant is both important, and hard to precisely measure. This reflects not only differences in definition, but also the fact that news outlets can differ in the extent of their slant. For example, a television station"s slant might change over time, or a paper"s news pages might have a different slant from its editorial pages. To capture this, it is useful to employ multiple measures of media slant, and to separately look at slant in content and editorial. Using data from Australia, we employ several metrics for measuring media slant.
In terms of content, we find that most media outlets are close to the center position. Coding media slant using mentions of left-wing and right-wing public intellectuals, we find that only one out of 27 outlets is significantly distinguishable from the center. We also conclude that there has been no systematic evolution in slant over time. Classifying the content of election articles, we find that only one of the nine newspapers is distinguishable from a centrist position.
However, when we look at editorial stances, more dispersion is apparent. Although headline-coding only reveals one newspaper that is significantly slanted, the pattern of editorial election endorsements is strongly skewed, with 36 out of 44 endorsements favoring the Coalition in the period 1996-2007. Consistent with this, we also observe substantial differences in political donations by media proprietors towards political parties, with donation ratios as high as 3:1 in favor of the Coalition.
To the extent that cross-country comparisons are possible, our results suggest that the Australian media -at least in terms of news content -are less partisan than their United
States counterparts. While this could be due to differences in methodology (and structural differences prevent an exact replication of the United States methods), it is also plausible that it reflects the effect of a less competitive media market. Visontay (2005) , except in the case of researchers at the Centre for Independent Studies or the Institute of Public Affairs, which are separately noted. Total parliamentary mentions are the total mentions in both chambers by major party parliamentarians between January 1996 and June 2007. Share of mentions by Coalition is the share of mentions that came from Coalition parliamentarians (the remainder being Labor mentions). Test of equality is a binomial probability test of the hypothesis that the share of Coalition mentions is equal to 0.47, which is the mean across all public intellectuals. 
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